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he past decade witnessed an increased
interest in the institutional framework of
monetary policy. The benefits of central bank
independence have been demonstrated in much
academic research and have become conventional
wisdom among policymakers.1 New questions have
emerged, however, about the institutional character-
istics of central banks and their effect on economic
performance; recent analyses have attempted to
identify optimal degrees of independence, account-
ability, and transparency in monetary policy.
Relative to the abundant literature on the effects
of central bank independence, only limited research
exists so far on the issues of transparency and
accountability in monetary policy. Furthermore,
empirical analyses have mostly focused on financial
markets and used time-series data.2 In this paper
we examine how monetary policy transparency is
associated with inflation and output in a cross-
section of 87 countries. We use a particular concept
of transparency that relates to the detail in which
central banks publish economic forecasts (hence-
forth “transparency in forecasting”). We employ a
new data set based on a survey conducted by Fry,
Julius, Mahadeva, Roger, and Sterne (2000) (hence-
forth FJMRS). To our knowledge these are the only
data covering transparency in monetary policy across
such a wide cross-section of countries.
Our results show that a higher degree of trans-
parency in monetary policy is associated with lower
inflation. The relationship is robust to various
econometric specifications and holds regardless
of whether the domestic nominal anchor is based
more on an inflation or a money target. In contrast,
our results suggest that the publication of forecasts
has no significant impact on inflation in countries
that target the exchange rate. In addition, we do not
find evidence to support the proposition that a high
degree of transparency is associated with higher
output volatility.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.
The next section reviews the relevant empirical and
theoretical literature. Section III provides a discus-
sion of our survey dataset. The econometric analysis
and the discussion of our results are contained in
Section IV, and Section V assesses the robustness
of those results.
II. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
The currently expanding theoretical literature
on central bank transparency identifies various
channels through which increased transparency
may affect economic policy outcomes. Not all of
these move in the same direction. And neither is
there a universally accepted definition of central
bank transparency.3 Various authors conceptualize
transparency in different ways, focusing on prefer-
ences, models, knowledge about the shocks hitting
the economy, the decisionmaking process, or the
implementation of policy decisions.4 The models
by Faust and Svensson (2000, 2001), Jensen (2000),
Geraats (2001a), and Tarkka and Mayes (1999) all
assume private information about the central bank’s
objectives/intentions. Transparency is modeled as
the degree of asymmetric information about control
1 See Blinder (2000). 
2 Some exceptions are the papers by Briault, Haldane, and King (1996)
and Nolan and Schaling (1996). Their focus, however, is on account-
ability rather than on transparency, and these accountability measures
involve only 14 countries. 
3 Blinder et al. (2001) assess why, how, and what central banks do and
should talk about. Winkler (2000) discusses issues related to the defi-
nition of transparency.
4 For example, see Geraats (2001a) for a classification.
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or (anticipated) economic shocks reflected in the
policy instrument (Cukierman, 2000a,b, and Tarkka
and Mayes, 1999).
In this paper we focus on the detail in which
central banks publish forecasts, since this variable
is of common interest both in theoretical models
of transparency and in related policy debates.5
Furthermore, publication of forecasts may allow
dissemination of information relating to the cen-
tral bank’s view of the world (economic models),
stochastic shocks, or preferences.
For any form of central bank transparency to
be relevant, some asymmetry of information in
monetary policy must exist. Recent empirical work
provides evidence suggesting central banks may
possess superior information. Romer and Romer
(2000), for example, show that if commercial fore-
casters had access to the Federal Reserve’s inflation
forecasts, they would generally find it optimal to
adopt them, discarding their own forecasts. Peek,
Rosengren, and Tootell (1998, 1999) also find that
the Fed’s forecasts benefit from an informational
advantage over the public that assists the Fed in con-
ducting monetary policy. Superior information here
is a product of the Fed’s supervisory function and
includes information about non-publicly traded
banks. 
Increased central bank transparency may reduce
uncertainty in financial markets. Studies employing
various methodologies provide evidence that market
participants react to the dissemination of macro-
economic information by the central bank. For exam-
ple, Clare and Courtenay (2001) employ an event
study methodology and use tick-by-tick exchange
rate data from London International Financial
Futures Exchange (LIFFE) futures contracts, finding
that the publication of forecasts in the form of the
Inflation Report has an information content for U.K.
market participants. Kuttner and Posen (2000) exam-
ine how shifts in the Federal Reserve’s and the Bank
of Japan’s degrees of transparency over time con-
tributed to the reduction of exchange rate volatility.6
Additional arguments in favor of transparency in
monetary policy include the insulation of monetary
policy from political pressures, increased account-
ability, facilitation of fiscal and monetary policy
coordination, and improved internal organization
of central bank analysis.7
In Faust and Svensson (2001), a high degree of
transparency in monetary policy is, in general,
welfare improving. Increased transparency reduces
the inflation bias, inflation variability, and employ-
ment variability. Faust and Svensson (2001) use a
modified Barro-Gordon model. The central bank’s
employment target is not announced and varies over
time according to an idiosyncratic component.
Fluctuations in this component of the employment
target tempt the central bank to deviate from an
announced inflation target. The central bank controls
inflation imperfectly and the inflation outcome has
two components: the central bank’s intentions and
a control error. The central bank decides upon the
extent to which it will reveal its knowledge of the
control error to the public. By revealing the control
error, the central bank renders its intentions for
inflation observable and thereby enables the public
to infer the central bank’s employment goal. Thus
the degree of central bank transparency increases
as the central bank reveals a greater proportion of
the observable component of the control error.
Analytically, Faust and Svensson (2001) distin-
guish among three different regimes of transparency.
In the first (least transparent) regime, neither the
employment objective nor the intentions of the
central bank are observable by the public. In the
second regime, with a high degree of transparency,
the inflation intentions of the central bank become
observable. Increased transparency in inflation inten-
tions results in lower inflation because it increases
the sensitivity of a central bank’s reputation to its
actions, making it more costly for the central bank
to pursue a high-inflation policy. The third regime is
one the authors classify as “extreme” transparency
where both the employment goal and the intentions
of the central bank are observable. The central bank’s
actions no longer convey additional information
about the inflation bias, and its reputation is no
longer affected by its actions. An inflationary bias
reemerges resulting in higher inflation, inflation
volatility, and unemployment variability.8
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5 See, for example, Buiter (1999) and Issing (1999) for a lively debate
about transparency and accountability among central bankers.
6 Other relevant studies include Dotsey (1987) and Haldane and Read
(2000). Thornton (1999) provides evidence on whether the Fed con-
trols the funds rate primarily through open market or “open mouth”
operations.
7 These views were expressed by Josef Tos
∨
ovsky `, who was at that time
Governor of the Czech National Bank. His views, and those of various
other central bank governors, are contained in Mahadeva and Sterne
(2000, pp. 186-205). For a discussion of policy-related arguments for
transparency in monetary policy, see Blinder et al. (2001).
8 This result is consistent with the results of the more general model
of policymaking by Morris and Shin (2001).
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similar to Faust and Svensson (2001), assuming
that the output target is private information to the
central bank and that the public’s capacity to deduce
it increases as the central bank publishes a greater
percentage of the inflation control error. In contrast
to Faust and Svensson (2001), who focus on the credi-
bility effects of central bank actions in the future,
Jensen (2000) uses a model with New Keynesian
elements (staggered price-setting and monopolistic
competition) and focuses on the marginal costs of
inflation within the current period. More trans-
parency increases the reputational costs of deviations
from the inflation target and therefore increases its
discipline and credibility. 
The literature does not suggest that a high degree
of transparency is unconditionally desirable. In
Jensen’s model, when central bank preferences are
already public information, the credibility-enhancing
effect of increased transparency becomes redun-
dant. Furthermore, in the presence of a shock that
requires counter-cyclical monetary policy, trans-
parency becomes a straightjacket. Thus, the choice
of the optimal degree of transparency is related to
the trade-off between flexibility and credibility. A
high degree of transparency is desirable for central
banks with poor credibility but may be costly in
terms of flexibility for high-credibility central banks.
Increased transparency may have the disadvan-
tage of eliminating the central bank’s strategic
advantage, thereby reducing its capacity to stabilize
the economy. “Cheap talk” and “optimal ambiguity”
arguments are characteristic expressions of this
view.9 Other papers focus less on the reputational
aspects of transparency and more on the conse-
quences of the central bank releasing information
about stochastic shocks. In Cukierman’s (2000b)
one-period model, the central bank’s private infor-
mation is about an upcoming shock. He uses a neo-
classical transmission mechanism, relying on an
expectations-augmented Phillips curve (i.e., a stan-
dard Barro-Gordon model) and a model along the
most recent neo-Keynesian lines that focuses on the
interest rate instrument. He examines the welfare
implications of different degrees of transparency
in each model. Under a regime of “limited” trans-
parency, the central bank reveals its information
about the upcoming shock after the public’s infla-
tion expectations have been set; conversely, under
“full” transparency this information is released
before the public forms its expectations. 
Different degrees of transparency in the neo-
classical version of the model merely affect the vari-
ability of inflation and not its average level. This is
because the public becomes aware of the supply
shock, and thus the central bank loses its informa-
tional advantage and cannot generate inflation
surprises to stabilize the economy. Expected social
welfare, however, is always higher under a limited
transparency regime compared with the full trans-
parency regime. This is because, under full trans-
parency, unexpected inflation is always zero and
therefore the central bank cannot affect employment.
This result holds under assumptions of both perfect
and imperfect (noisy) central bank forecasts. Under
perfect central bank forecasts, however, only the
variance of the policy outcomes is affected, whereas
under noisy forecasts the average policy outcomes
are affected as well.10
In the neo-Keynesian model of Cukierman
(2000b), society is indifferent between the two
regimes provided that interest rate variability does
not enter its loss function. When the social loss
function includes interest rate variability, however,
the limited-transparency regime is superior to the
full-transparency regime. Because the model incor-
porates a typical instrument rule, premature forecast
publication requires more nominal interest rate
variability in order to stabilize the ex ante real rate
and through it the output gap and inflation. 
Geraats (2001a) uses a two-period Barro-Gordon
model with a real-interest-rate transmission mech-
anism and focuses explicitly on the publication of
central bank forecasts. The central bank has private
information about both demand and supply shocks
and does not publish its inflation target. More trans-
parency in the first period allows the private sector
to observe the first period’s demand and supply
shocks and make inferences about the central bank’s
inflation target. More transparency therefore makes
the central bank’s reputation more sensitive to its
actions, so an “opaque” monetary policy regime is
characterized by higher inflation in the first period.
This is because the non-publication of the central
bank’s forecasts implies a reputation loss. Given the
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9 For example, in the “cheap talk” model of Stein (1989), the central
bank can generate inflation surprises. In the “optimal ambiguity”
model of Cukierman and Meltzer (1986), imprecise control of the
money supply allows the central bank to generate inflation surprises
according to its time-varying preferences. 
10 Cukierman’s (2000b) model does not include an explicit inflation
bias, but our analysis shows that the results are similar when the
model is extended to incorporate such a bias in the central bank’s
objective function.
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“weak” or “strong” in its aversion to inflation, the
public tends to interpret the non-publication as an
indication that the central bank is “weak.” Trans-
parency reduces the variability of inflation, but the
effect on output is ambiguous. More precisely, under
transparency, supply shocks lead to greater vari-
ability of output, whereas demand shocks lead to
less. The reason is that under opacity, the central
bank has less flexibility to adjust the interest rate
in response to shocks. So under opacity, supply
shocks lead to more variability in inflation and less
in output; thus the demand shocks are no longer
completely offset, leading to greater variability of
both inflation and output.
Tarkka and Mayes (1999) suggest that publishing
the central bank’s forecasts leads to better macro-
economic performance because the released infor-
mation reduces the private sector’s uncertainty about
the central bank’s intentions. The authors use a
Barro-Gordon model and assume that the central
bank does not publish its inflation target.
Our assessment of the literature points toward
appropriate measures of transparency for empirical
tests, possible implications for the macroeconomy,
and channels through which transparency may
affect inflation:
• Transparency is generally conceptualized as
the publication of central bank forecasts,
since this allows the public to observe the
control error.11
• The literature identifies a number of channels
by which transparency affects the macro-
economy. These are conditional on model
choice and specification (e.g., neoclassical
versus neo-Keynesian models, presence of
inflation bias) and assumptions such as the
initial degree of credibility enjoyed by the
central bank, the precise degree of trans-
parency, and whether the models are specified
over one or more periods.
• The effects of increased monetary policy trans-
parency in the existing theoretical models
are associated with variables such as average
inflation, output, inflation volatility, output
volatility, and interest rate volatility. Thus
the hypotheses we test in this paper are, in
general, consistent with the theoretical propo-
sitions of the recent literature. 
• A common element in the majority of the
models is that increasing transparency makes
the central bank’s reputation more sensitive
to its actions and therefore reduces the incen-
tive to pursue inflationary policies. Trans-
parency has less impact on the sensitivity of
reputation to the actions of the central bank
when its preferences are already known.
Regardless of the different implications of
increased transparency about social welfare
in the above models, more transparency
never results in higher inflation outcomes. 
• Another common element is that the improve-
ment in inflation performance may be offset
by a reduction in the capacity of the central
bank to stabilize the economy by surprising
the private sector with a policy-induced
demand shock.
III. A NEW DATA SET ON CENTRAL
BANKING INSTITUTIONS
In measuring transparency of central bank fore-
casts, we seek to establish the scope and coverage
of macro-forecasts published by central banks. Data
are taken from a survey of central banks contained
in FJMRS.12 They provide estimates of many trans-
parency characteristics. We focus on central bank
publication and explanation of macroeconomic
forecasts, since this emphasis is closest to that of
both theoretical and policy-oriented work on trans-
parency in monetary policy. 
The great majority of central banks in our sample
publish some form of forward-looking analysis—
79 percent of the 94 covered in the FJRMS survey.13
Forward-looking analysis may, of course, take many
forms, some of which may help to guide expecta-
tions more than others. For some central banks, the
publication of a money target is in itself a form of
forward-looking analysis, since such targets are often
more benchmarks rather than rules, and other fore-
casts must underpin the target. Other central banks
have attempted to guide inflation expectations by
presenting forecasts of a number of variables in
102 JULY/AUGUST 2002
11 An exception in the recent theoretical literature is Cukierman (2000a),
who focuses on the economic model and the operational objectives
of the central bank rather than central bank forecasts and votes. 
12 The characteristics covered in the FJMRS survey include numerical
measures of how policy decisions are explained and the quantity of
current analysis, research, and speeches provided by the central bank.
They also assess and provide scores for various aspects of account-
ability, independence, and target setting, each of which may contribute
to transparency and clarity in the monetary framework.
13 A total of 82 of these observations are included in our estimates. The
other 12 are excluded because other data do not match up with them.
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sion of risks.
The questions in the survey ask not only whether
the central bank provides forward-looking analysis.
They also consider the quality, scope, and frequency
of forecasts and the extent to which forecast errors
are monitored and publicly discussed. The exact
wording of the questions, along with the motivation
behind them, is provided below, with the distribution
of the results for each question shown in Table 1.
The questions are:
• What is the form of publication of forecasts? Is
it in words only, or is it also presented formally
in terms of numbers?14
Motivation: The “bottom line” of a forecast is
usually presented in a numerical or graphical
format, which may help to influence expec-
tations and discipline policy, since the fore-
cast may then be directly compared with a
target, and subsequently outcomes may be
compared with the forecast. The analysis
underpinning the forecast may, however, be
more important than the precise number,
since the accuracy of numerical forecasts may
sometimes be attributable to luck as well as
judgment. The questionnaire distinguishes
between those central banks that publish
forecasts: (i) using both words and numbers,
(ii) using either words or numbers, and (iii)
using neither.
• With what frequency does the central bank
publish forward-looking analysis in standard
bulletins and reports?
Motivation: Published annual targets for
money and inflation may help to guide expec-
tations, but they only do so over a particular
horizon. Forecasts published more frequently
will guide/anchor expectations and may dis-
cipline policy over different forecast horizons.
• Are risks to the forecast published; if so, in
what form? 
Motivation: A number of central banks use
their forecast as a vehicle for highlighting
the relative likelihood of various outcomes,
rather than to focus on a particular number.
The argument for publishing risks to a fore-
cast is that a forecast that rests on a single
number for each time period may be accurate
for spurious reasons. An assessment of risks
can convey a more accurate representation
of the forecasters’ subjective assessment of
monetary conditions. As with the first ques-
tion, the quality of risk assessment is judged
JULY/AUGUST 2002      103
14 Graphs are treated as identical to numbers in this analysis.
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Measure of Explanations of Forecasts and Forward-Looking Analysis: Questions and
Distributions of Responses
Categories of answers, 
Questions distribution of results All Industrial Transitional Developing
Form of publication  Words and numbers 35 16 5 14
of forecasts Either words or numbers 25 8 6 11
Unspecified 13 0 4 9
None 21 4 7 10
Forward-looking analysis  More than annually 39 18 7 14
in standard bulletins  At least annually 24 4 4 16
and reports Unspecified 10 2 4 4
Otherwise 21 4 7 10
Discussion of past  Yes 21 8 3 10
forecast errors Sometimes 9 7 2 0
No 64 13 17 34
Risks to forecast  Words and numbers 9 7 2 0
published Either words or numbers 23 9 4 10
None 62 12 16 34
Table 1according to whether both numbers and
words are used.
• Is there a discussion of past forecast error; if
so, is this a standard feature of discussion?
Motivation: Attempts to build credibility may
rest on becoming more open about the capac-
ity of the central bank (and other institutions)
to forecast accurately. An open assessment of
forecast errors may also reinforce the quality
of future forecasts.
Data Reliability
The FJMRS survey data are the most comprehen-
sive description available of central bank efforts to
explain policy. The questions are worded objectively
and cover a number of aspects of forecasting whose
publication could enhance transparency to varying
degrees, yet there are a number of reasons that
might suggest caution in interpreting and using the
data. We assess the implications of each in turn.
First, there could be a problem of sample
selection bias to the extent that only the “best
performers” respond. We are confident that the
FJRMS survey is largely immune to this problem
because of the very high response rate. Of 114
questionnaires, 94 were completed, and the survey
covers over 95 percent of world gross domestic
product (GDP). Furthermore, as the discussion of
forecasts was only one facet of a broad survey, it is
less likely that central banks were deterred by this
particular part of the questionnaire. 
Second, there could be problems with the sub-
jective nature of the responses. For example, the
distinction between publishing regular targets and
forecasts may become blurred in some cases. Some
respondents may have interpreted publishing an
intermediate money target as providing forward-
looking analysis. Such a target, after all, must be
based upon output and inflation projections. Other
countries, however, interpreted the publication of
an intermediate target as distinct from publishing a
forecast. This potential subjectivity bias may not
be serious, however, since the questionnaire asked
about the nature of publication, its frequency, and
the discussion of risks and forecast errors. 
A third problem is that it may be relatively easy
to change some transparency characteristics. Some
of the transparency measures in the survey have
been implemented only recently, and so they may
not have had an impact on inflation in the sample.
If the impact of these measures represents a signifi-
cant change in central bank behavior, the effect may
also take some time to influence inflation expecta-
tions. We consider this problem in the discussion
of the robustness of our empirical results.
IV. EMPIRICAL METHODS AND RESULTS 
As noted above, theoretical work on transparency
has generated a number of different propositions
about the effect of publishing central bank forecasts.
In order to evaluate these alternative models, in
this section we provide empirical tests of the effect
of transparency on inflation and on the volatility
of output, using a cross-section of 87 countries
over the period 1995-99. Our results show that there
is a statistically significant negative correlation
between transparency and inflation and, in partic-
ular, in countries with flexible exchange rate
regimes. At the same time, there is no evidence of a
cost of transparency in terms of increased output
volatility.
Constructing an Index for Transparency
of Forecasts
The FJMRS data set provides four separate indi-
cators that can be used to assess the detail in which
a central bank publishes its inflation forecasts.
These include the frequency with which forecasts
are published and whether past forecast errors and
risks to the forecast are discussed in publications.
These indicators are highly correlated, implying
that any regression that included each would exhibit
multicollinearity. This factor argues in favor of
aggregating the four to produce a composite measure
of transparency.
Rather than creating an aggregate measure by
simply taking the average of the different trans-
parency measures in the FJMRS data set, we con-
sidered to what extent the FJMRS indicators can be
arranged to form a Guttman scale. Its major advan-
tage is that, unlike an average of several variables, a
Guttman scale constructed from several indicators
does not result in a loss of information through
aggregation. A Guttman scale is constructed by
arranging binary variables in a sequence such that
a positive value for one indicator implies a positive
value for all previous variables in the sequence. To
construct a Guttman scale for transparency, we have
ordered our variables according to the decision tree
in Figure 1. Although a few of the central banks in
our sample do not fit this pattern (for example, they
discuss risks to their forecast but not past forecast
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for judging whether data can be ordered in a Guttman
scale is if the “coefficient of reproducibility,” defined
as the number of errors/total responses, is less than
0.10. (“Errors” are cases where ordering according
to a Guttman scale results in a false prediction for a
response.) Our transparency data set easily satisfies
this criterion, with a ratio of errors to total responses
of 0.08.15
The advantage of Guttman scaling is that, based
on the aggregate index, one can determine exactly
how a central bank scores on each of the four sepa-
rate sub-indicators. So, for example, a score of 2 on
our transparency index implies that a central bank
publishes forecasts and that it does so on at least
an annual basis, but it does not discuss either past
forecast errors or risks to the current forecast.16 In
contrast, if we took the simple average of the four
indicators, then a score of 2 could imply a positive
response on any two of the four sub-indicators. Fur-
thermore, we later show that our results are robust
to the use of either a Guttman scale or the simple
average of our four sub-indicators of transparency
in forecasting. The distribution of the Guttman scores
is as follows: Of the 82 countries, 25 have a Guttman
score of 0; 8 have a score of 1; 24 have a score of 2;
6 have a score of 3; and 19 have a score of 4.
Transparency and Inflation
As a first step toward investigating the effect of
transparency in forecasting in monetary policy, we
examined whether our index is negatively correlated
with average inflation across our 87-country sample.
Because the FJMRS data set examined transparency
at one specific point in time (1998), we are limited to
tests that consider only cross-country variation in
inflation, rather than variation over time. Given that
many reforms to increase central bank transparency
are quite recent, we also chose to use a brief period
for calculating average inflation (1995-99). This is
based on consumer price index (CPI) data from the
International Monetary Fund’s International Financial
Statistics. As discussed later, our results are nonethe-
less robust to using different time periods and to
running regressions based on data from individual
years.
Table 2 presents pairwise correlations between
levels of transparency and average inflation. We use
both our overall index and individual measures from
the FJMRS data set. There is a significant negative
correlation between all of these indicators and both
the level and the variability of inflation, and this
correlation is significant for the Guttman index in
both cases. 
As a next step, we examined whether this
relationship holds when controlling for other deter-
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casting, (ii) forward analysis, (iii) risks to forecast, (iv) past forecast
errors, generate virtually identical results for the 82-observation sample
that we use in our regression. 
16 This highlights the importance of having the overall data set closely
approximate a perfect Guttman scale, in order to be able to make this
inference.
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Figure 1
A Guttman Scale of Transparency in Forecasting
Forecast published?
(if no, index = 0)
Risks to 
forecast discussed?
(if no, index = 3)
(if yes, index = 4)
Forward analysis
annually?
(if no, index = 1)
Past forecast errors
discussed?
(if no, index = 2)minants of average inflation.17 To do this we followed
existing cross-country empirical literature on infla-
tion including Campillo and Miron (1996), Lane
(1997), Bleaney (1999), Romer (1993), and Ghosh,
Gulde, and Ostry (1995). First, we included the log
of real GDP per capita, based on the possibility that
lower-income countries may rely more heavily on
the inflation tax to finance government expenditures.
Second, we included a measure of openness,18 fol-
lowing Romer (1993) and Lane (1997) who argue that
incentives for policymakers to generate “surprise”
inflation are weaker in more open economies. We
also included a measure of political instability as a
control variable, based on the prediction from a num-
ber of different political economy models that a high
frequency of government turnover may shorten the
time horizons of politicians, prompting them to
adopt more inflationary macroeconomic policies.19
Finally, we added a dummy variable to control for
a country’s exchange rate regime (fixed=1).20 This
follows the theoretical arguments that emphasize
how pegging can serve as a commitment device. It
also follows empirical findings of Ghosh, Gulde, and
Ostry (1995), Bleaney (1999), and others who show
that there is a clear negative correlation between
exchange rate pegs and average inflation.
Table 3 reports the results of four cross-country
regressions. Regression (1) includes each of our
control variables in addition to our Guttman scale
for transparency in forecasting. The coefficient on
the scale is negative and highly significant. Our
second regression adds an interaction term, which
allows the effect of transparency to vary between
countries with fixed exchange rates and those
with flexible exchange rate regimes. This tests our
hypotheses about transparency in forecasting with
greater precision because arguments in favor of
publishing inflation forecasts apply, above all, to
economies with floating exchange rates where the
monetary authorities have greater control over the
domestic money supply. In small open economies
with a fully credible fixed exchange rate regime and
with full convertibility, publishing forecasts should
have no effect on average inflation since the central
bank has little or no control over domestic interest
rates or the money supply. Following Canavan and
Tommasi (1997) and Herrendorf (1999), exchange
rate pegs can be seen as an alternative strategy for
establishing transparency, since they provide the
public with an easily observable indicator over
which the government has direct control.
The results of regression (2) in Table 3 corre-
spond to those predicted in theory. In countries with
floating exchange rates, transparency in forecasting
is negatively correlated with average inflation. The
coefficient on our transparency index is highly sig-
nificant and becomes more negative when compared
with the result from regression (1).21 The significance
is accounted for by a high-point estimate of the
effect of transparency in inflation coupled with
relatively wide error bands. In a country with a
floating exchange rate that began with an inflation
rate of 12 percent per annum, we estimate that a
decision by the central bank to begin publishing
regular inflation forecasts (a move on the index from
0 to 2) would lead to a reduction in inflation of
between 1.8 percent and 7 percent per annum (the
95 percent confidence interval). In contrast, in coun-
tries with fixed exchange rates, transparency in
forecasting has less effect on inflation. According
to our estimates, the effect of a similar increase in
transparency in forecasting in a fixed exchange rate
country would be much smaller (reducing inflation
from 12 percent to 11.8 percent per annum).
We also investigated whether the effect of trans-
parency in forecasting on inflation might depend
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17 We restrict our attention to average inflation here because existing
empirical work focuses on this variable.
18 We define openness as (x+m)/GDP, where x and m stand for exports
and imports, respectively.
19 Drawn from a database created by Beck et al. (1999), this variable
measures the percentage of key decisionmakers (executive, legislative
majority[ies], coalition members) that change in a given year.
20 Based on the classifications in the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions.
21 The results are very simple from a regression that excludes countries
with pegged exchange rates.
Chortareas, Stasavage, Sterne REVIEW
Transparency and Inflation: Pairwise
Correlations
Log inflation
Guttman scale of transparency –0.37 (p < 0.01)
Publication? –0.29 (p = 0.01)
Forward analysis at least annually?  –0.15 (p = 0.15)
Past forecast errors discussed?  –0.21 (p = 0.05)
Risks to forecast considered? –0.28 (p = 0.01)
Number of observations 87
Table 2on whether countries are inflation targeters or
whether they target monetary aggregates. A num-
ber of authors have defined transparency as a key
ingredient of inflation targeting (e.g., Mishkin, 2000),
while some have gone further by arguing that
transparency is a prerequisite to inflation targeting
(Masson, Savastano, and Sharma, 1997). The latter
argument would suggest that transparency should
have a greater impact on the credibility of monetary
policy when adopted in conjunction with the use
of an inflation target. In regression (3) in Table 3,
we include two multiplicative dummy variables
representing transparency in countries whose frame-
works are based on inflation targets and money
targets. We first construct two variables, inflation
target and money target, each of which is a binary
variable compiled from several different indicators
in the FJMRS data set.22 These two variables are
then multiplied by the Guttman scale such that the
inflation (money) target multiplicative dummy is
equal to the value of the Guttman scale when the
country’s framework is based more upon an infla-
tion (money) target and is equal to zero otherwise.
The results of regression (3) suggest that the effect
of transparency on inflation may be stronger for
money-targeting frameworks, but tests reveal that
the difference between the coefficients is insignifi-
cant. In unreported results, we find that when
the binary dummy variables, inflation target and
money target, are included separately, neither is
significant.
Our estimates of the effects of our control vari-
ables on inflation are consistent with previous stud-
ies. Income per capita is negatively correlated with
inflation, while political instability tends to be asso-
ciated with higher inflation. As in previous studies,
there is a very large and very significant negative
correlation between exchange rate pegs and infla-
tion. One finding that may appear surprising is the
result that greater openness of an economy to trade
is not associated with lower inflation. Earlier studies
by both Romer (1993) and Lane (1997) using data
covering the 1970s and 1980s found evidence of
a negative openness-inflation correlation. More
recently Bleaney (1999) has reproduced earlier
findings with regard to the 1970s and 1980s, while
also concluding that there is no significant correla-
tion between openness and inflation in data from the
1990s. Given that our data cover the period 1995-99,
our results are consistent with those obtained by
Bleaney. We also investigated whether these results
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22 The questions ask central banks (i) to classify their regime, (ii) to report
if an explicit target was published for each variable, (iii) to rank objec-
tives in practice, and (iv) to indicate which variable prevails in policy
conflicts. Each country was allocated a score for each of the following:
exchange rate, money and inflation focus, and discretion. The maxi-
mum of these scores was classified as the “targeted” variable. This
definition is broader than that used in other papers (e.g., Mishkin and
Schmidt-Hebbel, 2000).
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Transparency in Forecasting and Average Inflation
Dependent variable: log inflation (1) (2) (3)
Log GDP per capita –0.47*** (0.07) –0.45*** (0.07) –0.50*** (0.066)
Openness –0.001 (0.002) –0.001 (0.002) –0.002 (0.002)
Political instability 1.13* (0.63) 0.97 (0.64) 1.07* (0.63)
Exchange rate peg (peg = 1) –0.47** (0.23) –0.95** (0.43) –0.74* (0.40)
Transparency in forecasting index –0.16** (0.07) –0.26*** (0.09)
Peg × transparency 0.25* (0.13) 0.01 (0.10)
Inflation target × transparency –0.15* (0.08)
Money target × transparency –0.24** (0.01)
Constant 6.04*** (0.54) 6.11*** (0.51) 6.40*** (0.55)
R
2 0.52 0.54 0.52
N8 2 8 2 8 2
NOTE: Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are in parentheses; ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent
levels, respectively.
Table 3with regard to openness were attributable to outliers
with very high levels of openness, but our results
rejected this possibility.
Transparency and Output Volatility
In addition to making predictions about the
effect of transparency on average inflation, models
of transparency in monetary policy also produce
comparative statistics about volatility of output.23
As noted, one’s prediction here depends heavily on
underlying assumptions. Our empirical investiga-
tion of the effect of transparency on output volatility
is limited by the lack of obvious controls to be used
in estimating cross-country differences in output
volatility. To construct measures of output volatility
(based on the standard deviation of GDP growth),
annual data were available for our entire sample
(1993-99), while quarterly GDP data were available
for 30 of our sample countries (also 1993-99). 
Table 4 reports the results of pairwise correla-
tions, using both the Guttman scale for transparency
and the individual indicators from the FJMRS data
set. There are several extreme outliers in our output
volatility data, and in order to obtain more robust
results we have excluded these countries from the
correlations reported in the table.24 The results
show that the correlation between transparency
and output volatility is often negative, especially in
the sample using quarterly data, but in only one case
is a correlation significant at conventional levels.
While this evidence certainly does not suffice to
demonstrate that publishing inflation forecasts
reduces output volatility, it does appear to be fairly
strong prima facie evidence against claims that
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23 We also tested for the effects of transparency on the volatility of
inflation, and our tentative results showed no significant positive or
negative impact.
24 In the sample based on annual data, Kuwait and the Kyrgyz Republic
were outliers in terms of having very high standard deviations of GDP
growth, while in the quarterly data Turkey was the only severe outlier.
We defined a “severe” outlier, x, using the following formula where
“pctile” refers to the percentiles of the entire sample: x<25pctile –
3(75pctile –25pctile) or x>75pctile+3(75pctile –25pctile).
Chortareas, Stasavage, Sterne REVIEW
Transparency and Output Volatility: Pairwise Correlations
Standard deviation  Standard deviation 
annual GDP growth (p value) quarterly GDP growth (p value)
Guttman scale of transparency –0.08 (0.47) –0.29 (0.13)
Publication? 0.06 (0.59) –0.10 (0.60)
Forward analysis at least annually? 0.02 (0.86) –0.25 (0.19)
Past forecast errors discussed? –0.22 (0.06) –0.20 (0.29)
Risks to forecast considered? 0.09 (0.43) 0.16 (0.40)
Number of observations 76 29
Table 4
Transparency and Output Volatility: Controlling for Terms of Trade Variability
Standard deviation  Standard deviation 
Dependent variable annual GDP growth quarterly GDP growth
Guttman scale of transparency –0.03 (0.12) –0.005 (0.004)
Standard deviation terms of trade shocks 0.53*** (0.14) 0.23 (0.29)
Number of observations 71 28
NOTE: Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are in parentheses; ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent
levels, respectively.
Table 5increasing transparency increases output volatility.
Results obtained before outliers were excluded were
also consistent with this finding.25
We also estimated several ordinary least squares
(OLS) regressions of output volatility on the Guttman
scale of transparency, controlling for the variance
of terms of trade shocks.26 The results, reported in
Table 5, show no significant effect of increased
transparency on output volatility.
V. INTERPRETING THE ROBUSTNESS
OF OUR RESULTS
The effort required for a central bank to publish
detailed forecasts may not appear to be particularly
arduous relative to the benefits of securing lower
inflation. Why, then, do many more central banks
not introduce detailed forecasts?27 We base our
detailed discussion of the robustness of our results
on five complementary explanations of this empiri-
cal conundrum:
• The result (that greater transparency in fore-
casting leads to lower inflation) is valid and
could be exploited by more central banks
than at present, but some central banks have
not yet completed the transition to greater
transparency. 
• The result is valid overall but may not be true
of all frameworks.
• The result is valid, but there may be offsetting
costs to transparency, which deter some
central banks from introducing it.
• The results may be overstated or invalid
because of endogeneity and reverse causality. 
• There may be other statistical biases.
Econometric techniques are necessary but
insufficient for judging the robustness of our results.
In this section we also include a detailed discussion
of how such tests relate to the theory and practice
of monetary frameworks. 
A Transition to Greater Global
Transparency in Monetary Policy?
One possible reason why only a relatively small
number of central banks publish detailed forecasts
may be that policymakers have not yet fully acted
upon the evidence that transparency can contribute
to lower inflation. The theoretical and empirical
evidence on the effects of transparency is relatively
new. Goodfriend’s (1986) landmark paper was among
the first to discuss the costs and benefits of secrecy
in monetary policy, in the context of the Merrill vs.
FOMC case.28 His paper was framed by questions
relating to how central banks might respond to
increasing evidence of the importance of expecta-
tions in economic decisionmaking. The theoretical
literature began to increase rapidly only at the end
of the 1990s, and our paper is among the first to
provide cross-country empirical evidence using
macroeconomic data. Similarly, the practical prece-
dents of frameworks in which published forecasts
contributed significantly in building credibility have
emerged only in the 1990s.29
Framework designers have not always been
quick to adjust their frameworks quickly in response
to new framework innovations,30 yet recent develop-
ments in global framework design suggest that
central banks are on a transition path toward much
higher average levels of transparency. Even since
FJMRS constructed their data, several countries have
markedly increased the information about their
forecasts.31 And the rapid global proliferation of
explicit money and inflation targets in the 1990s is,
according to Mahadeva and Sterne (2001), part of a
global trend whereby disinflating countries use tar-
gets more as a forecasting device than as a policy
rule.
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25 Before exclusion of outliers, all correlations were negative and seven
of ten were significant at conventional levels. 
26 The variable was based on an indicator from the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators. We then calculated this effect as a share of
GDP and took the standard deviation of this indicator over the period
1992-97.
27 In the FJMRS survey, only three central banks (Norway, Sweden, and
the United Kingdom) satisfy every criterion by which the authors
judged the detail in which central banks explain forecasts.
28 One of the Fed’s arguments for resisting greater transparency, that it
was difficult in the early 1980s to provide information evenly to all
market participants, has been eroded over time by advances in infor-
mation technology.
29 The discussion of central bank governors in Mahadeva and Sterne
(2000, pp. 182-205) illustrates that inflation-targeting countries have
made transparency a key aspect of their framework. The Bundesbank
has, according to Posen (2000), a long history of explaining its policies
well, yet its independence is more widely perceived as contributing
more strongly to its credibility.
30 For example, if regimes are classified according to money targeting,
exchange rate targeting, inflation targeting, and discretion, then only
three countries (Australia, the United Kingdom, and Uruguay) have
changed their regime as much as four times since the breakdown of
the Bretton Woods agreement.
31 Brazil, Chile, South Africa, and Thailand each now publish fan charts
for inflation and provide explicit discussion of risks to inflation fore-
casts in regular inflation reports.
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Different Effects on Inflation Across
Frameworks
Our discussion suggests that more explanation
of policy does not significantly reduce inflation under
all circumstances. Moreover, our point estimates of
the overall effect, though large, were surrounded by
relatively wide error bands, suggesting that there
are a number of frameworks that are exceptions to
the overall result. The governance structure of the
central bank may affect the willingness of the cen-
tral bank to publish forecasts. In some central banks,
senior policymakers are responsible for the pub-
lished forecast; in others, the central bank’s staff
are the sole authors.32 Such differential arrangements
may affect the perceptions of policymakers and
the public alike regarding the closeness of the link
between published forecasts and policy decisions,
and this in turn may affect the transmission chan-
nels between transparency and inflation outcomes.
To the extent that transparency operates by enhanc-
ing credibility, as is predicted by a number of the
models we have discussed, the effect of transparency
on inflation may be smaller when credibility has
been secured by actions rather than words. This
applies to exchange rate targeters (see results noted
previously) and may also apply to countries with
low inflation.33
Given that our sample includes countries both
with very low and very high average rates of inflation,
we examine the extent to which our results are
stable when we exclude high-inflation countries
from the sample. As a first step, we used a standard
procedure to determine whether the coefficient on
the Guttman scale was influenced by outliers. This
resulted in the exclusion of five observations, after
which the coefficient on the Guttman scale remained
significant.34 We then used a recursive estimation
procedure to examine how our results changed as we
progressively excluded high-inflation observations
from the remaining sample. This was an iterative
procedure which involved the following: (i) estimat-
ing regression (2) in Table 3 using a sample of the
50 countries with the lowest average rates of infla-
tion, (ii) adding the observation with the next highest
rate of inflation, and (iii) reestimating the regression
and then repeating the process until we reached
maximum sample size. Figure 2 plots the estimated
coefficient on the Guttman scale, together with
bounds for the 95 percent confidence interval
according to sample size. The coefficient becomes
progressively more negative as we include high-
inflation countries in the sample, suggesting that
the estimated anti-inflationary effect of publishing
a forecast in our Table 3 regressions may be some-
what inflated by the inclusion of high-inflation
countries.
Costs to Publishing Forecasts
There may be political and economic costs
associated with a central bank publishing forecasts,
and these may offset the benefits of potential reduc-
tions in inflation. To the extent that fiscal policy may
in some circumstances be the root of high inflation,
detailed forecasts are likely to pinpoint the source
of the problem and could, in some cases, lead to
tensions between the central bank and the govern-
ment. Transparency may, in such circumstances,
also be proxying for a degree of central bank inde-
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32 Kohn (2001) and Svensson (2001) include discussions on ownership
of the forecast in their respective reports.
33 A related issue is the optimal degree of transparency. It is conceivable
that there exist circumstances when increased transparency might
lead to a deterioration in welfare or an increase in inflation. Telling the
public about a likely financial or exchange rate crisis might precipitate
the crisis. And many central banks have developed well-resourced
press offices to manage the clarity of published information.
34 The countries excluded were Bahrain, Indonesia, Mauritius, Turkey,
and Russia. We tested for outliers based on the dfbeta statistic, which
measures the impact of an individual observation on a specific coeffi-
cient. Following standard practice, we excluded observations for which
the absolute value of the dfbeta statistic was greater than 
,
where n is the number of observations. The coefficient on the
Guttman scale was –0.29(0.08), p<0.01, after five outliers were elim-
inated (based on regression (2)).
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Figure 2pendence that may be very difficult to measure in
conventional surveys.35
There may also be economic costs to introduc-
ing transparency that prevent central banks from
publishing forecasts. The discussion of theoretical
literature pointed to circumstances in which greater
transparency may be associated with higher volatil-
ity in inflation and output. Where there is a risk of
a banking or exchange rate crisis, for example, it is
questionable whether or not a central bank should
highlight such an issue by publishing forecasts.
Cross-country evidence presented in Chortareas,
Stasavage, and Sterne (2002) indicates that increased
transparency may reduce the costs of disinflation
in a sample of mainly industrialized economies. 
Endogeneity and Reverse Causality?
There is a possibility that the results may be
affected by reverse causality whereby low inflation
may lead to greater transparency as well as being
caused by it. Similarly there may exist endogeneity
caused by cross-country differences in institutional
circumstances, or macroeconomic conditions may
imply systematic variation in transparency and
inflation. In this section we seek to address these
issues that have potentially serious implications
for bias in our results. 
Could it be the case that low inflation dissolves
a central bank’s preference for secrecy? Geraats
(2001a) models the effect of transparency on the
utility of both strong and weak central banks. Strong
central banks are defined as having lower (unpub-
lished) inflation targets than weak ones. She con-
siders two alternative scenarios that shed light on
the issue of endogeneity. In the first, transparency
is exogenous, being imposed by the public. Weak
central banks prefer secrecy since it affords them
an opportunity to conduct stabilization policies
with a lower probability of their preferences for
relatively high inflation being revealed. In the case
of transparency being an endogenous choice of
the central bank, however, weak central banks also
choose greater transparency. They overcome an
inclination toward secrecy because they appreciate
that secrecy will itself be interpreted by rational
agents as a sign of weakness.36
We attempt to assess empirically the extent of
any endogeneity. First, we can demonstrate that
although transparency is positively correlated with
other measurable characteristics of a country’s
economic, legal, and political environment, our
results remain robust even when we control for the
fact that transparency might be endogenous to these
other factors. The second column in Table 6 shows
simple correlation coefficients between our Guttman
scale of transparency and other variables to which
it might arguably be endogenous. These include
measures of development (per capita GDP, OECD
membership), other features of monetary policy
(a focus on inflation objectives, legal central bank
independence, quality of central bank analysis37),
and measures for the political environment (democ-
racy, political instability, political polarization, type
of legal system38). As one might expect, transparency
is positively correlated with a number of these vari-
ables, but in no case is the correlation high enough
to suggest that transparency is perfectly correlated
with another variable. Two of these variables, per
capita GDP and political instability, are already
included in our Table 3 regressions. As a next step,
we reestimated regression (2) from Table 3 while
adding one of the variables that may affect trans-
parency. We repeated this procedure for each vari-
able. In every single case, the coefficient on the
Guttman scale remains negative, significant, and
of roughly the same magnitude as in the original
regression. The Guttman scale coefficient also
remained significant when we included all variables
in Table 6 simultaneously. 
Although we can demonstrate that our trans-
parency index is not merely proxying for levels of
income or the level of democracy, it remains possible
that our index may, to some extent, be influenced
by some other political or economic variable x
which may be difficult to measure directly. It may
be possible to investigate this indirectly, though. If
this unmeasurable variable x involves some broad
change in the economic or political conditions that
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35 Fry (1998) questions the extent to which survey measures are capable
of fully capturing central bank independence.
36 Geraats qualifies this channel in her paper and provides possible
reasons why, in spite of her results under endogenous choice of
transparency, not all central banks are transparent. Furthermore, in
Geraats (2001b) the author shows that the desirability of transparency
depends critically on the institutional framework. In this model, when
the central bank has limited independence, less transparency reduces
the government’s information about the economy, which discourages
it from overriding the central bank.
37 The FJMRS study collected data on the extent to which central banks
conduct detailed analysis of inflation expectations (based on market
information) and on the sophistication of the models used to generate
forecasts.
38 The type of legal system is a dummy variable distinguishing whether
countries have a common legal system. Data are taken from La Porta
et al. (1998).
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average inflation, then we might expect it to lead
also to improvements in other policy outcomes that
are exogenous to inflation. For example, in many
countries dramatic turnarounds in economic policy
often involve both reductions in inflation and
improvements in a government’s fiscal balance, to
the extent that fiscal balance can be seen as being
exogenous to inflation. Likewise, a policy turnaround
is also likely to lead to an improvement in the rating
on a government’s foreign currency bonds, which
should be independent of domestic inflation. This
suggests using the fiscal balance and the rating on
foreign currency–denominated bonds in order to
proxy for x. We can then perform the same test that
we performed for variables such as “democracy.”
Table 7 shows the results, while also showing the
simple correlation of each variable with the Guttman
scale. The results strongly suggest that our original
results with respect to transparency and inflation
cannot be attributed entirely to broader policy
improvements. 
We also considered directly the possibility of
reverse causality, whereby the negative correlation
between transparency and inflation could reflect
the fact that central banks are more likely to publish
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Correlation of Transparency to Economic, Political, and Legal Variables
Correlation  Coefficient on Guttman  Number of
with Guttman after inclusion† observations
Democracy 0.23 –0.34 (0.10) 64
GDP per capita 0.34 –0.26 (0.09) 82
OECD member 0.39 –0.21 (0.09) 82
Inflation target 0.17 –0.26 (0.10) 82
Central bank independence (FRJMS) 0.32 –0.28 (0.10) 82
Central bank independence (Cukierman‡) –0.10 –0.39 (0.12) 47
Type of legal system 0.15 –0.26 (0.10) 82
Quality of CB analysis 0.44 –0.32 (0.09) 82
Political instability 0.07 –0.26 (0.09) 82
Political polarization 0.02 –0.24 (0.09) 82
NOTE: “Democracy” from the Polity III data set; “inflation target,”“ central bank independence,” and “quality of analysis” from the
FJMRS data set; “political instability” and “polarization” from Beck et al. (1999). Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are in
parentheses; ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
†Each coefficient may be compared to –0.26, the result from regression (3) in Table 3.
‡Cukierman’s central bank independence measure for 1980-89. A number of smaller countries in Cukierman’s data set were not
included in the FJMRS survey.
Table 6
Endogeneity of Transparency to Broader Policy Measures
Correlation  Coefficient on Guttman  Number of
with Guttman after inclusion observations
Fiscal surplus 0.30 –0.25 (0.11) 59
Foreign currency bond rating 0.37 –0.20 (0.08) 58
NOTE: “Foreign currency bond rating” from Standard & Poor’s, January 2000; “fiscal surplus” from International Financial Statistics.
Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are in parentheses; ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels,
respectively.
Table 7forecasts when they have greater control over macro-
economic outcomes. If this assessment is accurate,
one would expect central banks to decide whether
to make their forecast public based on the level and
the volatility of past inflation (and potentially out-
put). A bias would be introduced in our results, then,
to the extent that lagged inflation or lagged inflation
volatility is correlated with the current level of
inflation.
For each of our sample countries using the five
years preceding our sample period (1990-94), we
calculated the mean absolute deviation of inflation
and output from their desirable levels during this
same period (2 percent inflation and 2.5 percent
annual output growth). We also calculated the mean
absolute deviation of inflation and output from their
average level for the period, in order to measure
volatility. As the endogeneity critique would suggest,
our Guttman scale for transparency is in fact nega-
tively correlated with lagged inflation outcomes
over the 1990-94 period (see Table 8). We then
included each of these four measures as control
variables in regressions using the specification from
regression (3) in Table 8. As can be seen in Table 8,
the coefficient on the Guttman scale is essentially
unchanged when we control for both lagged output
and lagged output volatility. However, when we con-
trol for lagged inflation and lagged inflation volatility,
the coefficient on the Guttman scale is less negative
and somewhat less significant in each case (p=0.10
and p=0.07). The reduction in the significance of
the coefficient after the inclusion of lagged inflation
is to some extent inevitable. Lagged inflation is itself
likely to have been caused partly by lagged trans-
parency, measures of which are not at our disposal.
So although we acknowledge that it is difficult to be
certain that there is not some endogeneity between
transparency and inflation, we are reassured that
the association is clearly detectable even when we
control for the effect of the average rate or volatility
in past output and inflation.
Other Robustness Issues
We also considered several other robustness
issues, including whether or not our results are
stable when we consider subsamples of low-inflation
countries, whether changes in the time period affect
the results, and whether modifications in the Guttman
scale lead to significantly different inferences.
In addition to investigating outliers, we also
determined the extent to which our results are robust
with regard to modification of the time period con-
sidered. When we performed regressions based on
inflation data for individual years between 1995 and
1999, the coefficient on our transparency index was
always negative and generally statistically significant
at conventional levels.39
We also examined the possibility that the
Guttman scale might not be the most appropriate
technique for examining the relationship between
average inflation and the transparency indicators
collected as part of the FJMRS survey. We compared
the results of our regressions using a Guttman scale
with two alternative specifications. The first alter-
native was to take the simple average of the four
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39 Coefficients and standard errors for each successive year were –0.29
(0.10) for 1995, –0.15 (0.17) for 1996, –0.30 (0.09) for 1997, –0.28
(0.21) for 1998, and –0.41 (0.20) for 1999.
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST.L OUIS Chortareas, Stasavage, Sterne
Endogeneity of Transparency to Past Inflation and Output Outcomes
Correlation  Coefficient on Guttman 
with Guttman after inclusion
Past deviation of output from desirable –0.16 –0.24 (0.10)**
Past output volatility –0.26 –0.23 (0.09)***
Past deviation of inflation from desirable –0.42 –0.16 (0.10)*
Past inflation volatility –0.43 –0.20 (0.11)*
NOTE: “Past deviation of output from desirable” is average absolute deviation from 2 percent real GDP growth over 1990-94. “Past
output volatility” is the mean deviation of real GDP growth with respect to the average level of GDP growth. “Past deviation of infla-
tion from desirable” is average absolute deviation from 2.5 percent inflation over 1990-94. “Past inflation volatility” is the log of the
mean deviation of inflation 1990-94 with respect to the average level of inflation for the same period. Heteroskedastic-consistent stan-
dard errors are in parentheses; ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Table 8indicators. To test which of the two specifications
(Guttman vs. average) provided more explanatory
power, we used a simple non-nested test developed
by Davidson and MacKinnon (1981); the test results
supported using the Guttman scale.40
The second alternative to the existing Guttman
scale involved creating a matrix of dummy variables,
each of which takes a value of 1 for a particular
range of values of the Guttman scale. This method
allows the estimated effect of each step on the
Guttman scale to vary, whereas introducing the
Guttman scale as a single variable constrains the
estimated effect of each successive step upward on
the Guttman scale to be constant. Our sample coun-
tries can be divided into three groups of roughly
equal size for this purpose. First, there are 25 coun-
tries that do not publish any form of inflation fore-
cast (Guttman = 0). Second, there are 32 countries
that publish a basic forecast that, in most cases,
includes forward analysis on at least an annual basis
(Guttman=1 to 2). Finally, there is a third group
of 25 countries that publish an inflation forecast
including a discussion of previous forecast errors
and, in most cases, a discussion of risks to the fore-
cast (Guttman=3 to 4).
We repeated regression (2) from Table 3, while
substituting two dummy variables for the Guttman
scale: one for countries with Guttman values of 1
and 2, and the other for countries with Guttman
values of 3 and 4. Both dummy variables had the
expected negative sign, and the dummy for Guttman
values of 3 and 4 was both more negative and more
statistically significant than the dummy for Guttman
values of 1 and 2.41 These results suggest that while
there may be significant gains from publishing a
basic inflation forecast, the marginal gain in terms
of inflation performance from publishing a more
detailed forecast may be even larger. It should be
noted, though, that because the coefficient on the
dummy for Guttman values of 1 and 2 was not
highly significant, using a standard F test, we were
unable to reject the null hypothesis that the coeffi-
cients on the two dummies were equal.
A final potential robustness issue involves the
measurement of our dependent variable. While
much of the cross-country literature on determi-
nants estimates a semi-log model which minimizes
the effect of high-inflation outliers, Bleaney (1999)
argues that using log inflation as a dependent vari-
able results in too much weight being given to coun-
tries with very low inflation. As an alternative, he
suggests estimating an equation where the depen-
dent variable is (πi)/(1+πi), where πi is inflation in
the ith country. All of our results from Table 3 remain
robust when we use transformed inflation instead
of log inflation as our dependent variable. As a further
alternative, we also repeated our Table 3 regressions
using a Box-Cox model, and the results of this esti-
mation were nearly identical to our original semi-log
specification.
Our Bottom Line on Robustness
We have subjected our results to numerous
econometric tests, and they remain reassuringly
robust. But how far have we gone in explaining the
apparent empirical conundrum we highlighted at
the start of the section—that few central banks pub-
lish forecasts in full detail in spite of the evidence
that such acts would facilitate lower inflation?
Although we have controlled for a number of addi-
tional variables in this section, it remains possible
that the negative correlation we observe between
transparency and inflation is biased by our inability
to control for unobserved country effects.
To be absolutely confident that our results are
subject to zero econometric bias, we would need
more data. To eliminate the possibility of reverse
causality affecting our results, for example, we would
need to distinguish those central banks that were
publishing forecasts merely to rubber-stamp their
reputation, and those that were reluctant to publish
because inflation was high. Such causality analysis
would benefit from a time series or panel data on
transparency, yet so far these data are unavailable.
We feel comforted, however, that we know of no
example of a framework in which policymakers
have reduced transparency in response to an
increase in inflation. Furthermore, to the extent that
transparency locks in low-inflation policies even if
it is introduced when inflation is already low, then
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40 The J test involves estimating each specification and saving the fitted
values as a first step. Then, in the second step the fitted values from
each specification are included as an additional explanatory variable
in the alternative specification. The t statistic on the coefficient for
the fitted values can then be used as a test of the null hypothesis that
the alternative specification does not add any explanatory power. Using
this test we rejected the null hypothesis that the Guttman specification
did not add explanatory power to the “average” specification. In con-
trast, we could not reject the null hypothesis that the “average” specifi-
cation does not add explanatory power to the Guttman specification. 
41 The coefficient (and standard error) for the dummy Guttman values
of 1 and 2 was –0.48 (0.38). The coefficient for the dummy Guttman
values of 3 and 4 was both larger and highly statistically significant:
–0.98 (0.37), p<0.01. 
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since transparency may be effective in reducing
and maintaining low inflation.
Of greater practical relevance could be the pos-
sibility that some central banks have attempted to
improve macroeconomic policy by simultaneously
altering policy preferences, transparency, and other
aspects of the institutional framework, which could
be argued to be the case in some inflation-targeting
countries.42 Cukierman (2000c) develops a model
where there is a possibility of a policymaker being
dependable or weak, yet inflation control errors
are sufficiently large to offer weak policymakers a
possible cloak of disguise. Dependable policymakers
like to raise the probability of being revealed as such,
whereas opportunistic policymakers like to reduce
the probability of being revealed as weak. An inter-
pretation of his results is that a decision to become
transparent and a decision to become dependable
may be observationally inseparable. Even with good
time-series data, it would be difficult to identify
the precise empirical role of transparency in such
circumstances, yet our conclusion that publishing
forecasts can lead to lower inflation is unaffected
by this sort of endogeneity.
Overall, we acknowledge that in spite of the
battery of tests we employ, we cannot be sure that
our tests using cross-section data eliminate all pos-
sible biases. Yet our existing tests have gone far
enough to make us confident that we have identified
empirically an established theoretical channel for
attaining and maintaining low inflation. Further-
more, there are important global policy implica-
tions: many central banks around the world could
secure improved credibility and lower inflation by
publishing their forecasts in greater detail.
VI. CONCLUSION
There are a number of aspects to central bank
transparency, yet recent theoretical models and
much of the policy debate focus on the role of the
publication of central bank forecasts. The existing
literature provides mixed suggestions and evidence
on the welfare effects of monetary policy trans-
parency. It is virtually unanimous, however, about
the main proposition tested in this paper: greater
transparency in monetary policy leads to lower
inflation. Furthermore, one of the most important
channels identified by the theoretical literature is
entirely consistent with the practical experiences
of the numerous central banks that have chosen
to explain policy more thoroughly: transparency
makes a central bank’s credibility more sensitive to
its actions.
This paper is the first to consider detailed cross-
country evidence for a wide range of countries
covering the effects of central bank transparency
on monetary policy outcomes. We construct an
index of central bank transparency based on forecast
publications by central banks. The main empirical
result is that greater transparency in publishing
forecasts is associated with lower inflation. We
acknowledge that it is difficult to be certain that
there is not some endogeneity between transparency
and inflation. We are, however, reassured that the
result is robust to a comprehensive set of econo-
metric specifications and robustness checks, and
the association between transparency and inflation
is detectable even when we control for the effect of
the average inflation rate or volatility in past output
and inflation.
Our results suggest that transparency contributes
to lower inflation whether or not policy is based
more on an inflation-targeting or money-targeting
anchor for policy. In countries that target the
exchange rate, the publication of forecasts does not
appear to have a significant impact on inflation.
Finally, we do not find evidence supporting the
proposition that a high degree of transparency is
associated with higher output volatility. 
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